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INTRODUCTION

Debates on protection for famous trademarks often center around state
and federal antidilution laws. Both the old Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995 and the new Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 have generated
many law review articles and numerous symposia.1 The dilution law focuses
on trademarks deemed famous within U.S. boundaries. A debate on
protection for famous trademarks today is incomplete without a discussion of
the other famous marks doctrine. The other famous marks doctrine recognizes
marks famous in other countries without actual use in the country where a
user adopts the trademark on similar goods and services.
In the age of globalization, both goods and people move across national
borders. Moreover, in the age of the internet, people move in cyberspace,
transcending physical borders; as people move, they carry with them
knowledge about certain trademarks and the associated reputation embodied
in those trademarks. A trademark famous outside the United States, but
known only to a certain segment of the U.S. population due to peoples'

*Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Former IP Associate, Fried Frank Harris
Shriver & Jacobson (NYC); Pryor Cashman Sherman & Flynn (NYC). This Article was solicited
as part of the 'International and Comparative Aspects of Trademark Dilution" Symposium. Many
thanks to Professors Mark Janis and Peter Yu for the invitation. Special thanks to Erik Darwin
Hille and Khai-Leif Nguyen-Hille for their love, patience, and support.
1 See generally Symposium, An Online Symposium on the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 98 (2006); Symposium, Trademark Dilution:
Theoretical and EmpiricalInquiries, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 449 (2007).
A search on Westlaw conducted on May 14, 2008, for articles with titles containing "trademark"
and "dilution" from 2006 to May 2008 yielded forty articles.
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movements across borders, prompts a discussion on whether the consuming
public should be protected from the likelihood of confusion or fraud. Until
now, U.S. courts never have recognized a famous marks doctrine because it is
a doctrine that originates from international treaties, such as the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention")2
and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
("TRIPs"). 3 Although the United States is a signatory to both, these treaties
are not self-executing and so do not automatically become a part of U.S.
domestic law. This Article will focus on U.S. courts' treatment of the famous
marks doctrine, particularly the recent split between the Second and Ninth
Circuits on this issue. The split epitomizes two opposite views on fame: use
and territoriality. On the one hand, the Second Circuit's approach ignores the
fame a foreign mark has attained outside the United States and recognizes
trademark rights only if the mark is in use in the United States. On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit embraces the possibility that the fame a foreign
mark attains outside the United States may be known by the relevant
consumer within the United States, and hence recognizes that trademark
rights may exist to protect the consumer from confusion. 4 Neither approach
leads to satisfactory results. The bright-line rejection of the famous marks
doctrine by the Second Circuit because of the treaty-based nature of the
doctrine places the United States in a position contrary to other countries. 5
However, the Ninth Circuit's public-policy-based embrace of the doctrine for
the purpose of protecting consumers may open doors to a new uncertainty in
the requirement of the foreign marks' fame. This Article ultimately concludes
that courts should not act as legislative bodies concerning the law on the
famous marks doctrine, instead leaving the issue to Congress.
II.

FAMOUS MARKS DOCTRINE AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Trademarks are territorial. Indeed, a trademark symbolizes the goodwill
cultivated by the trademark holder within a territory that its consuming
public recognizes and from which it expects consistency within that
territory. 6 Under the territoriality principle, a trademark is treated as having

Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
2

3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs].
4 See infra Part III.

5 See Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An
International Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 768-73 (2006) (discussing the protection available in China,
Brazil, and South Africa to famous marks with fames attained abroad, but unregistered within
the country extending the protection).
6 Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1171-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The territoriality

doctrine recognizes that:
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an independent existence in each nation in which the trademark is
recognized and protected. 7 Due to this independent existence, ownership of a
mark in one country does not provide ownership of and rights to the mark in
another country. 8 One exception to the territoriality principle is the famous
marks doctrine of the Paris Convention and TRIPs. 9 A mark that is famous in
a country or countries is also recognized and protected in another country
even though the owner of the mark has not registered or used the trademark
in that country. 10

[A] trademark has a separate legal existence under each country's laws, and
that its proper lawful function is not necessarily to specify the origin or
manufacture of a good (although it may incidentally do that), but rather to
symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic markholder so that the
consuming public may rely with an expectation of consistency on the domestic
reputation earned for the mark by its owner, and the owner of the mark may
be confident that his goodwill and reputation (the value of the mark) will not
be injured through use of the mark by others in domestic commerce.
Id.
7 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling New ExtraterritorialReach

of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REV. 483, 489 (2003) (discussing the territoriality doctrine in
trademark protection).
8 See Barcelona.com, Inc. v. Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona, 330 F.3d 617, 628 (4th
Cir. 2003) ("United States courts do not entertain actions seeking to enforce trademark rights
that exist only under foreign law."); E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc.,
756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir. 1985) ("Our concern must be the business and goodwill attached
to United States trademarks, not French trademark rights under French law.").
9 See ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 157 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining the famous foreign
mark doctrine):
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention and Article 16(2) of TRIPs requires
member states ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an
interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the
use, of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a
translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent
authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that
country as being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this
Convention and used for identical or similar goods. These provisions shall
also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a reproduction of
any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to create confusion
therewith.
Id. at 156; see also Paris Convention, supranote 2, at art. 6bis; TRIPs, supra note 3, at art. 16(2).
10 Punchgini,482 F.3d at 156-57. The court notes that the purpose of the famous marks doctrine

in international treaty law and quotes G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE
PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 90 (1968) that the doctrine:
[1]s to avoid the registration and use of a trademark, liable to create
confusion with another mark already well known in the country of such
registration or use, although the latter well-known mark is not, or not yet,
protected in that country by a registration which would normally prevent the
registration or use of the conflicting mark.
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Federal trademark law in the United States has long remained silent as
to the recognition of famous foreign marks.11 Although the Lanham Act has
an antidilution provision protecting trademarks deemed famous within the
United States, no statutory provision squarely addresses whether a famous
2
foreign mark is entitled to trademark protection in the United States.1
Recently, the Second and Ninth Circuits have rendered decisions on U.S.
protection for famous foreign marks, adopting opposite approaches. These
decisions, Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v.Dallo & Co, Inc. 13 and ITC, Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc., 14 respectively decided by the Second and Ninth Circuits,
demonstrate the struggle to develop common law solutions in an area where
globalization and movements by people pose challenges to the territoriality
principle in trademark law.
A. Famous Marks Doctrine and Public Policy
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit, in Grupo Gigante v. Dallo, became the first
and only appellate court to accept the famous marks doctrine as an exception
to the territoriality principle. 15 The court recognized the exception as a
matter of sound public policy. 16 The facts of Grupo Gigante unfold as follows.
In 1962, more than forty years before the litigation began, the Grupo
Gigante company opened its first grocery stores in Mexico City. 17 Grupo
Gigante obtained trademark registration in Mexico and became a successful
chain of grocery stores with 100 stores located throughout different parts of
Mexico.' 8 In 1991, it opened six stores in Baja California, Mexico, and two in
Tijuana, near the U.S.-Mexican border. 19

11 Id. (noting that there is no federal trademark protection for famous foreign marks and
observing that the first case that recognized the famous foreign mark in the United States was a
New York state case, Maison Prunier v. Prunier'sRest. & Cafr, Inc., 288 N.Y.S. 529, 535-36
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936)). In Maison Prunier, the plaintiff owned "Maison Prunier," a Paris
restaurant with a branch in London and brought an unfair competition action against the
defendant for using the French trademark for its restaurant in New York. Id. at 535-36. The
plaintiff prevailed even though it never had used the trademark in the United States. Although
there was no "right to protection against the use of a trade-mark or trade name beyond the
territory in which it operates," the New York court recognized "an exception to the rule" where
the second user was guilty of bad faith. Id. at 557-58.
12 See Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 163 (stating that relevant provisions in the Lanham Act do not
incorporate "a famous marks exception into federal unfair competition law").
13Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004).
14Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 143.
15Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094 (observing that there is "no circuit-court authority-from this
or any other circuit-applying a famous-mark exception to the territoriality principle").
16Id. at 1094.
17Id. at 1091.
18Id.
19 Id.
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In 1991, Michael Dallo selected the name "Gigante Market" for his
grocery store in San Diego, and five years later, in 1996, he and his brothers
opened another "Gigante Market" in the same city. 20 Meanwhile, Grupo
Gigante explored the possibility of expanding its grocery stores into the
southern region of California and learned about the Dallos' "Gigante
Market."2 1 Grupo Gigante met with the Dallos, but failed to persuade them to
cease using the trademark "GIGANTE" for their grocery stores. 22 Both Grupo
Gigante and the Dallos each obtained trademark registration for GIGANTE
from the state of California, but neither sought to register the mark with the
23
United States Patent and Trademark Office.
In 1999, Grupo Gigante opened its first U.S. GIGANTE store and followed
with two more stores by 2000 in the Los Angeles area. 24 Upon learning about
the opening of the Gigante store, the Dallos sent a cease-and-desist letter to
Grupo Gigante, demanding that Grupo Gigante stop using the GIGANTE name
for its grocery stores. 25 Grupo Gigante responded by filing a suit against the
Dallos for improper use of its well-known GIGANTE mark protected under
Articles 6bis and l0bis of the Paris Convention, false designation of origin,
and misrepresentation and unfair competition under § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, among other claims. 26 The district court ruled in favor of Grupo Gigante
27
and the Dallos appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit.
At the outset, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the territoriality
principle is the bedrock of trademark law because trademark rights exist in a
country solely in accordance to that country's law. 28 The territoriality
principle dictates that priority of trademark rights depends upon use of the
trademark in the United States and not use in other countries. Consequently,
the court observed, despite the fact that Grupo Gigante had used the GIGANTE
mark in Mexico for decades before the Dallos began its use of the mark in
San Diego, the Dallos would have priority over Grupo Gigante in the mark
29
GIGANTE for grocery stores in the United States.

20 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1091.
21

Id.

22 Id.
23

Id. at 1092-93.

Id. at 1092 (stating that all three stores were located in the Los Angeles area and all "were
called 'Gigante,' like Grupo Gigante's Mexican stores").
25 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1092.
24

Id. at 1093 n.3 (listing the claims brought by Grupo Gigante and the counterclaims asserted by
the Dallos).
26

27

Id. at 1092-93.

28

Id. at 1093.

29 Id.
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The Ninth Circuit, however, emphatically announced that "there is a
famous mark exception to the territoriality principle." 30 Although the
territoriality principle is a "long-standing and important doctrine" in
trademark law, "it cannot be absolute." 31 The court explained that an
absolute territoriality rule, without an exception for famous marks, would
"promote consumer confusion and fraud." 32 It recognized that today people
and commerce move across borders, and that this is especially true in the
United States as a nation of immigrants. 33 Because the purpose of trademark
law is to protect against consumer confusion and palming off, there "can be
no justification for using trademark law to fool immigrants into thinking that
they are buying from the store they liked back home." 34 The appellate court
then instructed the district court to apply a new standard to determine how
famous a mark must be to qualify for the exception to the territoriality
principle. 35 In summary, the Ninth Circuit recognized the famous mark
exception based on public policy.
Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit did not rely on the Paris Convention
36
in recognizing the famous mark exception to the territoriality principle.
Indeed, the circuit did not reference the language of any article in the Paris
37
Convention to support its recognition of the famous marks doctrine. It
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs claims of trademark
rights under the Paris Convention and declared that the Paris Convention
creates no "additional substantive rights" to those provided by the Lanham
Act.38 The circuit sidestepped any potential conflicts of law between the Paris
Convention and the Lanham Act with respect to the famous mark exception
30 Grupo
31

Id.

32

Id.

Gigante,391 F.3d at 1094.

33 Id.
34 Id. at 1098 (explaining that under the new test, "a substantial percentage of consumers in the
relevant American market" must be shown to have familiarity with the foreign mark and courts
should consider factors such as "the intentional copying of the mark by the defendant, and
whether customers of the American firm are likely to think they are patronizing the same firm
that uses the mark in another country" (emphasis in original)).
35 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1095-98 (explaining the new standard to evaluate how famous a

mark must be to qualify for the exception and remanding the case back to the district court to
apply the new standard).
36 The

Second Circuit in Punchgini acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit in Grupo Gigante had
stated that the Paris Convention does not provide any substantive protection for trademarks
beyond the federal Lanham Act. ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 162-63 (2d Cir.
2007). The Ninth Circuit's statement was important because it indicated that "marks rights are
independently afforded by the Lanham Act." Id. at 163.
37 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1093-99.
38 Id. at 1099-1100. The Grupo Gigante court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the

plaintiffs state law claim which does not recognize the famous marks doctrine. Id. at 1101
(observing that cases cited by plaintiff "provide no support for the conclusion that use anywhere
in the world suffices to establish priority in California").
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doctrine by formulating a new rule based solely on public policy. 39 This rule
was subsequently rejected by the Second Circuit three years later in ITC,
40
Ltd. v. Punchgini,Inc.
B. Famous Marks Doctrine and Bright-Line Rejection
More than thirty years ago, before the Bukhara trademark dispute, the
Bukhara restaurant opened in the Maurya Sheraton & Towers, an
international five-star hotel located in New Delhi. 41 After the successful
opening, the owners expanded the reach of the Bukhara trademark in many
major cities worldwide, including Hong Kong, Bangkok, Bahrain, Montreal,
Bangladesh, Singapore, Kathmandu, Ajman, New York, and Chicago. 42 The
London-based Restaurant magazine named Bukhara as one of the world's
43
fifty best restaurants in 2003.
The Bukhara restaurant opened in New York City and Chicago in 1986
and 1987, respectively. 44 The owners sought and received trademark
registrations for their restaurants in 1987. 4 5 The Bukhara restaurant in
Manhattan operated for five years and closed its doors in 1991.46 The Chicago
Bukhara survived longer and closed down after ten years in operation, on
December 17, 1997. 4 7 As of 2004, Bukhara restaurants operated only in New
48
Delhi, Singapore, Kathmandu, and Ajman.
As the Bukhara restaurants began to close, the owners explored the
possibility of distributing packaged, ready-to-serve foods under the Bukhara
label, "Dal Bukhara," in 2001. 4 9 In 2003, the owners began selling their food
through two distributors in California and New Jersey. 50 That same year, the
owners exhibited their "Dal Bukhara" products at the International Fancy
Foods Show in New York City.51

39 Id. at 1099-1100.
Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 159-60 (observing that "it appears that the Ninth Circuit recognized
the famous marks doctrine as a matter of sound policy").

40

41

Id. at 143.

42 Id.

43 Id. at 143 n.4.
44 Id. at 143.
45 Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 143.
46 Id.

47 Id.
48

Id.

49 Id.
50 Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 143.
51 Id.
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During the same time period, Vicky Vij, a former employee at the New
York Bukhara restaurant teamed up with Raja Jhanjee, Dhandu Ram, and
Paragnesh Desai to open Bukhara Grill restaurants in 1999.52 Vij, Jhanjee,
53
and Ram also previously had worked at the New Delhi Bukhara restaurant.
The four individuals, along with their business partners, incorporated the
first company, Punchgini, to open the Bukhara Grill and the second company,
Bukhara Grill II, Inc., for the opening of the second restaurant in New York
54
City, Bukhara Grill 11.
The defendants admitted that they purposely selected the name because
the original New York Bukhara restaurant had closed. 55 Defendants copied
the authentic Bukhara restaurant's "logos, decors, staff uniforms, wood-slab
menus, and red-checked customer bibs."56 Moreover, the defendants claimed
that their Bukhara Grill restaurant "is quite like Delhi's Bukhara." 57 The
opening of the Bukhara Grill attracted attention from news reporters who
58
thought the restaurant was related to the famous Delhi's Bukhara.
In early 2000, counsel for the owners of the original Bukhara restaurant
sent cease-and-desist letters to the defendants, demanding the defendants
refrain from using the BUKHARA trademark and goodwill. 59 Counsel for the
defendants asserted that the owners had abandoned their trademarks in the
United States. The parties corresponded but did not resolve the dispute. In
early 2003, the owners of the original Bukhara restaurant brought a
trademark infringement and unfair competition action under both the federal
Lanham Act 6 o and New York state laws against the defendants. 61 The district

52 Id. at 144.
53 Id.

54 Id.
55Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 144 (noting that the defendants candidly admitted that there was then
"no restaurant Bukhara in New York, and we just thought we [would] take the name").
56

Id.

57 Id. (commenting on Jhanjee's, one of the defendants, statement about deliberate copying).
58 Id. (citing to the press coverage of Bukhara Grill from Shweta Rajpal, Dal 'Bukhara'in NY: A
Bukhara-TrainedTrio Has Opened a Similar Restaurant in Manhattan,HINDUSTAN TIMES, May

2, 2000, and from Bob Lape, Indian Outpost Needs Dash of Spice, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., Dec. 13-19,
2000, which noted "name similarity between Bukhara Grill and [the] former New York
Bukhara").
59 Id. at 144.

60 Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 154. Under § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act, the plaintiff can bring an
action against the defendant who uses "any word, term name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof ...

which. . . is likely to cause confusion ...

as to the origin, sponsorship, or

approval of [the producer's] . . . services." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). A § 43(a)(1)(A) claim is
broader than the protection afforded under a § 32(1)(a) trademark infringement claim. Section
43(a) protects unregistered trademarks. See Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)
("Section 43(a) prohibits a broader range of practices than does § 32, which applies to registered
marks, but it is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks.")
(citation omitted).
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court granted defendants' summary judgment motion, finding that the
plaintiffs could not sustain their claims because they had abandoned their
BUKHARA trademark for restaurants in the United States.62
To overcome the defense of abandonment, the plaintiffs rested their case
on the famous marks doctrine. 63 The plaintiffs urged the Second Circuit to
recognize that their BUKHARA mark was famous and that they had priority
over the defendants in the trademark. 64 They asserted that they had
continuously used and branded their BUKHARA trademark in the last thirty
years in many countries and that their trademark was renowned in the
United States before the defendants deliberately copied the Bukhara name
65
and restaurant trade dress for their Bukhara Grill in New York City.
The Second Circuit in ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc. flatly rejected the
famous marks doctrine. 66 The Punchgini court noted that although the
Second Circuit had made references to the famous marks doctrine on two
occasions, neither of the two prior decisions required the court to determine
whether it must apply the doctrine. 67 The court observed that the Ninth
Circuit was the only federal appellate court that had recognized the famous
marks doctrine "as a matter of sound policy," and it declined to follow the
Ninth Circuit. 68 The Second Circuit explained that the international treaties
for the protection of famous marks, the Paris Convention and TRIPs, are not
self-executing and the Lanham Act remains the federal law governing
whether the owners of the original BUKHARA trademark have priority rights
in the United States.69 The court examined relevant provisions under the
Lanham Act and held that they did not expressly incorporate the famous
61 Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 145.
62

Id. (citing ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).

63

Id. at 156-58.

Id. at 156 (stating that the plaintiff urged the court to "recognize an exception to the
territoriality principle for those foreign marks that, even if not used in the United States by their
owners, have achieved a certain measure of fame within this country").
6

65

Id. at 154.

Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 164 (declining to construe the Lanham Act to allow the famous mark
doctrine as an exception to the territoriality principle and waiting "for Congress to express its
intent" on the departure).
66

Id. at 160 (noting that the decision in Buti v. Impressa Perosa,S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98, 104 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1998), concluded that the "famous marks doctrine has no application here given that
Impressa has made no claim under that doctrine" and that Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v.
Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 481 (2d Cir. 2005), declined to decide whether the famous marks
doctrine should be recognized because "even assuming that the famous marks doctrine is
otherwise viable and applicable, the [Cuban] embargo bars [plaintiff] from acquiring property
rights in the ... mark through the doctrine") (citation omitted).
67

68 Id.

at 159-60.

Id. at 162 (asserting that the Second Circuit had "expressly held that the Paris Convention
creates no substantive United States rights beyond those independently provided in the Lanham
Act" in Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 485 (2d Cir. 2005)).
69
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marks doctrine or the protection for famous marks stated in Article 6bis of
70
the Paris Convention and Article 16(2) of TRIPs.
The Second Circuit explicitly declined the plaintiffs' invitation to adopt a
policy-based approach for judicial recognition of the famous marks doctrine
under federal law. 71 It noted that policy arguments can be persuasive at
times, but in the context of the Lanham Act, which is comprehensive and
frequently amended by Congress, it is not appropriate for the judiciary to
recognize the famous marks doctrine as an exception to the territoriality
doctrine. 72 Congress is the body to decide "whether and under what
circumstances to accord federal recognition to such an exception to the basic
73
principle of territoriality."
The Second Circuit's decision in Punchgini and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Grupo Gigante epitomize the two opposite views on U.S.
protection for famous foreign trademarks. Punchgini represents a steadfast
adherence to the U.S. use requirement in U.S. territory while ignoring the
fame of the foreign trademark. Grupo Gigante recognizes the fame of the
foreign trademark transmitted through the migration of people who recognize
and expect consistency from the mark, even though there is no use of that
particular mark within U.S. territory. Both decisions demonstrate how U.S.
courts struggle with fame, use, and territoriality in addressing trademarks in
7
the age of increasing globalization. 4

Id. at 162-63. The court remarked that it was "mindful" that its conclusion is contrary to the
leading commentator's position on famous marks doctrine. Id. at 163 (disagreeing with Professor
McCarthy's conclusion that "both the TRIPs Agreement and the Paris Convention Article 6bis
require the United States to recognize rights in famous foreign marks, even if they have not been
registered or used in the United States") (citation omitted).
70

Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 165 ("The fact that a doctrine may promote sound policy, however, is
not a sufficient ground for its judicial recognition, particularly in an area regulated by statute.").
71

72

Id.

73 Id.

74 The Second Circuit, after affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on the federal and state trademark infringement claims and the federal unfair
competition claim, certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals because the Second
Circuit "recognized the possibility that the famous marks doctrine might support a New York
common law claim for unfair competition." ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d 159, 160 (2d
Cir. 2008). The two certified questions were: (1) "Does New York common law permit the owner
of a federal mark or trade dress to assert property rights therein by virtue of the owner's prior
use of the mark or dress in a foreign country?"; and (2) "If so, how famous must a foreign mark be
to permit a foreign mark owner to bring a claim for unfair competition?" Id. The New York Court
of Appeals responded that to pursue an unfair competition claim under New York law, the
plaintiffs must establish both deliberate copying and secondary meaning. See ITC, Ltd. v.
Punchgini, Inc., 880 N.E.2d 852, 859-60 (N.Y. 2007); see also Punchgini,518 F.3d at 161. Upon
receiving the responses from the New York Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's award of summary judgment in its entirety. ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 518 F.3d
159 (2d Cir. 2008).
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III.

FAME, USE, AND TERRITORIALITY

A. Use and Territoriality:Forget Fame
Both the Second and the Ninth Circuits agreed that the territoriality
principle is fundamental to trademark rights. They agreed that under the
territoriality principle, without use of the foreign trademark in the United
States, there will be no trademark rights. 75 There are numerous possible
examples of trademark use. 76 Obviously, having the mark affixed to products
in the stream of commerce constitutes use. 77 Also, having a website with the
mark as a source identifier for the content provided at the website constitutes
use. 78 Even mere advertisement of the trademark in the United States while
offering the actual products for sale outside the United States also may
satisfy the use requirement. 79 Whoever uses the mark first will have
priority.80 Whoever files an intent-to-use federal trademark application first
also can claim priority. 8' Without either using the mark or filing an intent-touse application, a trademark owner cannot establish priority. The
territoriality of trademark rights requires all domestic and foreign trademark
owners to follow U.S. law if they want to avail themselves of its protection for
their trademarks.
Both the Second and Ninth Circuits also agree that the Paris Convention
does not provide additional substantive trademark rights and that the
Lanham Act remains the governing law for trademark rights in the United
States.8 2 Article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides a famous mark
76Id.at 155-56; Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2004),
76In order to be qualified as trademark use, the use must be lawful. See CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA

Health Scis., Inc., 474 F.3d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "use in commerce only creates
trademark rights when the use is lawful") (emphasis in original).
77See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark

Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1643 (2007) (discussing actual use and "token uses" of trademarks).
Other examples of trademark use to establish priority under trademark law include prior use
of a term in advertising brochures, catalogues, newspapers, press releases, and trade
publications. See Malcolm Nicol & Co. v. Witco Corp., 881 F.2d 1063, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
78

79See generally Int'l Bancorp, L.L.C. v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a

Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003). The dissenting opinion strongly opposed the majority's
ruling on "use in commerce" based on mere advertisement and lack of use of the mark in the
United States. Id. at 383.
8o See Starbucks U.S. Brands, L.L.C. v. Ruben, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1741, 1750 (T.T.A.B. 2006)
(noting the priority of the trademark owner in its various STARBUCKS marks prior to the "filing
date of applicant's application, which in the absence of other evidence, is the earliest date on
which applicant can rely").
81 In cases where neither party can establish priority of registration or use of the trademarks, the

parties' application filing dates are crucial in determining priority. See Aktieselskabet af 21. Nov.
2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861, 1864 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (parties' application
filing dates control the determination of priority).
ITC, Ltd. v. Puncligini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 162-65 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288
(2007); Grupo Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., 391 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2004).
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exception protection, but the Paris Convention itself only dictates signatory
members to provide national treatment. 83 The Lanham Act complies with the
Paris Convention by treating domestic and foreign trademark owners the
same. Foreign trademark owners must follow the Lanham Act just as
domestic trademark owners do in order to receive trademark protection. The
Lanham Act imposes the use requirement on both domestic and foreign
trademark owners.8 4 That means that the territoriality principle governs
trademark rights in the United States.
The circuits' views on the territoriality principle, however, divert from
here. The Second Circuit took the view that regardless of the fame a foreign
trademark has attained outside the United States, if the foreign trademark is
not in use here, than no trademark rights exist in the United States.8 5 Also, if
the owner of the famous foreign trademark used the mark in the United
States for a period of time, but then ceased to use it in the United States
while continuing to use it outside the United States, no trademark rights
exist here since the owner abandoned the mark.88 Under the Second Circuit's
rule, the territoriality principle is absolute. There is no exception to the
principle. Regardless of the trademark's fame outside and inside the United
States, no use means no rights.
The Ninth Circuit has an entirely different view. The Ninth Circuit's
approach that "territoriality . . . cannot be absolute" means that use of the
mark in the United States is not required for protection8 7 as long as the mark
itself, through use outside the United States, is known by people in the
8
United States. 8
Indeed, if the foreign trademark is known by people in the United States
who believe that the American junior user's mark is the same as a foreign
trademark, an exception to the territoriality principle applies.8 9 In other

83 Id. at 162-63 (discussing "national treatment" requirement and citing to Grupo Gigante for its
statement on affirming that the Lanham Act, not the Paris Convention, is the law).
84 Id. at 162 ("National treatment means that foreign nationals should be given the same
treatment in each of the member countries as that country makes available to its own citizens.
So, section 44 of the Lanham Act gives foreign nationals the same rights and protections
provided to United States citizens by the Lanham Act.").
85 Id. at 155 (stating that without use "of its mark in the United States, a foreign mark holder
generally may not assert priority rights under federal law, even if a United States competitor
has knowingly appropriated that mark for his own use"). Cf. Section 44(e) of the Lanham Act,
however, provides for registration of a foreign mark that has been registered in the home
country, as long as the application indicates the applicant's bona fide intention to use the foreign
mark in commerce in the United States, "but use in commerce shall not be required prior to
registration." 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2006).
86 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 153 (affirming the defendant's abandonment defense).
87 Id. at 1094.
88 Id.

89 Id.
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words, if the fame of the foreign trademark reaches the United States
because of people migrating across national borders, the trademark remains
protected, in order to prevent confusion as to the source. The fame of the
trademark, according to the Ninth Circuit, is not the typical fame in the
federal trademark dilution law, based on years of sales of goods or extensive
advertisements bearing the trademark in the United States. 90 The concept of
fame, as recognized by the Ninth Circuit, depends on the movements of the
people who recognize the mark. 91
The Ninth Circuit relies on the main purpose of trademark law,
protecting consumers from source confusion, but allows the law to bend the
territoriality principle. However, its approach necessitates an extensive
factual inquiry as to fame. How famous must a foreign mark be in order to
justify a departure from the territoriality principle? What is the standard to
measure fame? Should the fame of the foreign mark for the territoriality
exception require niche fame or a heightened level of fame as required under
the federal trademark antidilution law? We turn now to these questions.
B. Forget Use and Territoriality,but Retain Fame
Generally, a trademark garners its fame through extensive sales and
advertisement of the goods in commerce. Over time, the consuming public
may come to recognize the trademark within a particular industry or a
9o For examples of niche fame requiring substantial sales and advertisements, see generally Nina
Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 889 F.2d 1070, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (NINA RICCI mark,
known for perfume, clothing, and accessories, was deemed famous within its niche based on $200
million in sales, $37 million in advertising, and more than 27 years of use); Kimberly-Clark Corp.
v. H. Douglas Enter., Ltd., 774 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating the fame of HUGGIES

trademark, known for its diapers, was based on $300 million of sales in a nine-year period and
annual advertisements of $15 million); Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs., Inc., 748

F.2d 669, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that the SPICE ISLANDS trademark for teas, spices, and
seasonings was in use for forty years and garnered sales of $25 million annually); Giant Food,
Inc. v. Nation's Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that the fame of
the trademark GIANT FOOD, known for supermarkets, was based on sales over $1 billion annually
and its use for forty-five years).
91The Ninth Circuit provided an example about fame dependent on the movement of the people
as follows:
It might not matter if someone visiting Fairbanks, Alaska from Wellington,
New Zealand saw a cute hair-salon name-"Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow,"
'Mane Place," "Hair on Earth," 'Mary's Hair'em," or "Shear Heaven"-and
decided to use the name on her own salon back home in New Zealand. The
ladies in New Zealand would not likely think they were going to a branch of a
Fairbanks hair salon. But if someone opened a high-end salon with a red door
in Wellington and called it Elizabeth Arden's, women might very well go
there because they thought they were going to an affiliate of the Elizabeth
Arden chain, even if there had not been any other Elizabeth Ardens in New
Zealand prior to the salon's opening. If it was not an affiliate, just a local
store with no connection, customers would be fooled. The real Elizabeth
Arden chain might lose business if word spread that the Wellington salon
was nothing special.
Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1094-95.
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region. This means, through use, the trademark has achieved fame within a
niche. To qualify for antidilution protection, however, a trademark must
achieve national fame, not just niche fame. 92 That is, the consuming public
nationwide must recognize the trademark in order for the trademark owner
to gain antidilution protection against a junior user of an identical or similar
93
trademark that causes tarnishment or blurring.
In light of the fame requirement under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2006, should the same standard be applied to famous foreign
mark exceptions to the territoriality principle? Before exploring possible
answers to this question, the famous mark exception to the territoriality
must first be recognized, as announced by the Ninth Circuit in Grupo
Gigante. In other words, use in the United States is not of concern, and fame
becomes the main inquiry.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that when foreign use of a mark achieves a
certain level of fame within the United States, the territoriality principle
does not bar that mark from claiming priority over the earlier foreign use. 94
Yet, how is fame measured in this context? The district court applied the
secondary meaning test and found that the GIGANTE mark had achieved
secondary meaning in the geographical area where the plaintiff wished to
assert protection. 95 The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's approach,
stating that "secondary meaning is not enough" and ruled that additional
tests are required in order for the foreign trademark to qualify as an
96
exception to the territoriality principle.

92

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006) (defining a famous trademark as one that "is widely

recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the
goods or services of the mark's owner"). See also Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating
Co., Inc., 509 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2007).
In considering whether a mark is famous for the federal trademark antidilution protection,
courts may consider the following factors:
93

(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of
the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services
offered under the mark.
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006); see also Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Intern., Inc., No. 2:05-cv-1468GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2688499 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007) (finding the NIKE trademark famous as it
is widely recognized by the general consuming public).
94 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1095-98 (discussing how fame must be established in the United
States and factors for consideration).
95 Id. at 1095 (noting that the district court held that "the correct inquiry ...
whether the mark had attained secondary meaning in the San Diego area").
96 Id. at 1098.
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The Ninth Circuit ruled that when a foreign mark has never been used in
the United States, the trademark holder must establish that "a substantial
percentage of consumers in the relevant American market is familiar with
the foreign mark." 97 The relevant American market is the geographic area
where the defendant uses the trademark. 98 The Ninth Circuit instructed that
the district court should consider factors related to consumer confusion and
fraud, such as the intentional copying of the mark by the defendant and the
likelihood that the defendant's customers think that they are "patronizing
the same firm that uses the mark in another country." 99
The "substantial percentage" phrase, however, leaves wide open for
interpretation the precise meaning of the requirement. Does it mean less
than 20 percent, 50 percent, or more than 50 percent? Even if the
"substantial percentage" means more than 50 percent, the fame requirement
for the exception to the territoriality principle, as announced by the Ninth
Circuit, is only niche fame because it is known only within the relevant
geographic area where the U.S. company uses the foreign trademark. The
mark need not be known to the general consuming public. That means the
requirement is higher than necessary for protection in a domestic trademark
infringement and unfair competition case. On the other hand, that also
means the requirement is lower than the level of fame required for the
trademark antidilution protection. The requirement is an intermediate level
of fame.
Consequently, the "substantial percentage" of consumers in the relevantmarket requirement may be established mainly by survey evidence of
recognition, rather than by use of the trademark in the United States. The
public perception in the relevant U.S. market without the trademark owner's
actual use of the trademark in commerce means that the traditional usebased proof-such as evidence of sales of products in the United States,
advertisements of the products in the United States, and market expansion
history in the United States-are not available.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

A LEGISLATIVE, NOT JUDICIAL, SOLUTION

The Second and Ninth Circuits' conflicting decisions on the famous marks
doctrine exception to the territoriality principle may lead one to speculate
that the United States Supreme Court may accept a certiorari petition to
address the issue. Although the Court has been eager to hear other types of
intellectual property cases, such as patent cases, and to overturn the Federal
Circuit's decisions, it has declined to accept certiorari for ITC Ltd. v.

97 Id.

(emphasis in original).

98 Id.

99 Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1098.
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Punchgini, Inc..100 The Supreme Court was wise to deny the certiorari
petition.
Congress can best address the issue of whether the Lanham Act should
be amended to provide recognition of famous foreign marks. Currently, U.S.
trademark law is at odds with numerous countries that recognize and
incorporate the famous marks doctrine into their trademark law.10 1
Understanding the influence of trademark owners on the direction of
trademark law in the United States, Congress most likely will not tackle the
famous marks doctrine if the International Trademark Association ("INTA")
does not initiate the amendment efforts and endorse it.102 INTA may not
express interest in having U.S. law provide an exception to the territoriality
principle because owners of known global trademarks have already registered
their marks in the United States, and the United States is a large and
important market of foreign goods and services. The fact that the famous
marks doctrine has not become an important issue of concern to trademark
owners for more than sixty years may reinforce the belief that the Lanham
Act, as amended numerous times, does not need to address the famous marks

doctrine. 103
INTA, as the largest organization of trademark owners worldwide,1 0 4 and
Congress should study and decide whether to amend the Lanham Act to
accept the famous marks doctrine. Cases in the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board, state courts, and federal courts all encounter the famous marks
doctrine. Most federal decisions avoided addressing the doctrine directly.10 5
As the Second Circuit in Punchgini noted, every lower court or state court
recognizing the doctrine has based its decision mainly on state common
law.10 6 Cases with claims based on the famous marks doctrine, however, will
100 ITC,

Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 157 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 288
(2007).
101Bruce J. Goldner & Kenneth A. Plevan, Circuit Split on Famous Marks: With Recent Denial of
Certiorari,Two CircuitsRemain at Odds Over Mark Rights Without Local Usage, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
29, 2007, at S1 ("If Punchgini is upheld, the United States will be out of step with many other
jurisdictions, such as France, Spain, and Italy, that, based on Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention, incorporate the famous marks doctrine explicitly into their trademark statutes.");
see also Weissberger, supra note 5, at 768 (noting that China, Brazil, and South Africa extend
protection to unregistered famous foreign marks).
102 Goldner & Plevan, supra note 101, at S1. (stating that Congress' interest in addressing the
famous marks doctrine is dependent on INTA's level of interest).
103The first case decided on the famous marks doctrine was Maison Prunierv. Prunier Rest. &
Caf6, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1936); see also ITC, Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135,
157-61 (2d Cir. 2007) (reviewing state and federal actions related to the famous marks doctrine).
104 INTA has more than 5500 members in 190 countries. Int'l Trademark Ass'n, About INTA,
http://www.inta.org/index.php?option=com content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=37&getcontent=
4 (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).
105 See Punchgini, 482 F.3d at 157-61 (noting that no federal tribunal or court had directly
recognized the famous marks doctrines until the Grupo Gigante decision).
le0Id. at 157-58.
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not go away, particularly now that the Ninth Circuit explicitly has recognized
the doctrine as an exception to the territoriality principle as a matter of
sound public policy.
Cases with claims based on the famous marks doctrine will appear again
and perhaps with more frequency in the future. International travel has
become common today, and people move with ease from one country to the
next. People travel for permanent and temporary employment, crossing
national borders frequently. Moreover, in the age of the internet, people move
in cyberspace, with several billion websites allowing internet users to cross
invisible national borders to conduct communication and transact businesses
with a click of a mouse.10 7 Consequently, the famous marks doctrine
exception becomes more appealing to protect consumers from being misled as
to the source of the goods or services offered in connection with a mark
known outside the physical space of the United States. 108

107 A reference indicates that there are more than five billion websites, excluding MySpace pages
and Google pages. WikiAnswers, What Is the Total Number of Websites?, http://wiki.answers.com/
Q/What isthetotal_number_of_websites (last visited Apr. 2, 2008).

108 See De Beers L.V. Trademark, Ltd. v. Rosenblatt, No. 04 CIV. 4099 (DLC), 2005 U.S. Dist.
Lexis. 9307, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2005) (U.K. plaintiffs brought suit against a U.S. company
alleging violation of their trademark, noting that "[r]ecognition of the famous marks doctrine is
particularly desirable in a world where international travel is commonplace and where the
Internet and other media facilitate the rapid creation of business goodwill that transcends
borders").

